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THE FUTURE OF
SUPREME COURT REFORM
Daniel Epps∗ & Ganesh Sitaraman∗∗
For a brief moment in the fall of 2020, structural reform of the
Supreme Court seemed like a tangible possibility. After the death of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in September, some prominent Democratic
politicians and liberal commentators warmed to the idea of expanding
the Court to respond to Republicans’ rush to confirm a nominee before
the election, despite their refusal four years prior to confirm Judge
Merrick Garland on the ground that it was an election year.1 Though
Democratic candidate Joe Biden won the Presidency in November,
Democrats lost seats in the House and have a majority in the Senate
only through the tiebreaking vote of the Vice President.2 These slim
margins, which make aggressive legislative action appear unlikely, led
observers to conclude that “court reform is effectively dead for the foreseeable future.”3
But is that really so? This Essay seeks to examine the prospects for
Supreme Court reform — in both the short and the long term. We argue
that it is too soon for proponents of Supreme Court reform to give up.
Some modest reforms are still possible today, despite current political
realities. And more ambitious reforms may return to the agenda sooner
rather than later.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗
∗∗

Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis.
Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Law and Government, Vanderbilt Law
School. For helpful conversations, we are grateful to Leah Litman, Gabe Roth, and the editors of
the Harvard Law Review.
1 See Astead W. Herndon & Maggie Astor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Death Revives Talk of Court
Packing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/us/politics/what-iscourt-packing.html [https://perma.cc/5HJ8-8HNG].
2 See Alexander Burns, Democrats Beat Trump in 2020. Now They’re Asking: What Went
Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/20/us/politics/democratshouse-races-trump.html [https://perma.cc/83BA-H8F4]; Jim Tankersley & Michael D. Shear, With
Democrats in Control, Biden Moves to Advance Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/business/democrats-biden-agenda.html
[https://perma.cc/SXR8-Q9HX].
3 Matt Ford, The Supreme Court Is in Charge Now, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/160178/supreme-court-biden-judicial-gridlock
[https://perma.cc/S5ZD-8WPF]. While Ford’s article was written before the January 2021 Georgia
Senate runoffs that gave Democrats narrow control over the Senate, he made clear his prediction
did not turn on that possibility. See id; see also Mary Kay Linge, What Joe Biden and Democrats
Can and Can’t Do with Control of Congress, N.Y. POST (Jan. 9, 2021, 10:45 AM), https://
nypost.com/2021/01/09/what-joe-biden-and-dems-can-and-cant-do-with-control-of-congress
[https://perma.cc/J7U9-652J].

2021]

SUPREME COURT REFORM

399

In other work we have developed our own proposals for Supreme
Court reform.4 We have also attempted to situate Supreme Court reform within broader constitutional-theoretic debates about judicial review in a democracy.5 Here, our goal is not to persuade the reader to
pursue our reforms nor to accept our preferred theoretical framework.
Our ambition is more pragmatic and more pluralistic; we hope to provide immediate help to policymakers and reformers who are thinking
about these issues, by identifying various possibilities for reform to ensure that the policy discussion considers all the options.
The Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we acknowledge that at
present, significant structural reform appears unlikely given the current
configuration of the Senate. But we argue that this does not mean that
no reform of the Supreme Court is possible. Instead, we suggest there
are a number of less aggressive, but still meaningful, reforms that might
generate sufficient bipartisan support to obtain passage in Congress —
and we think this kind of “skinny” Court reform is worthy of serious
consideration, even if it does not solve all the problems that proponents
of reform hope to address. While much of the focus of Court reform has
centered on Congress, we also identify, perhaps surprisingly, changes
within the Executive Branch that could have a significant effect on the
Supreme Court’s operations. And finally, we outline a variety of voluntary reforms that the Justices themselves could adopt that would help
turn down the temperature — and change the perception — of the politics surrounding the Supreme Court. Again, while we do not necessarily endorse these reforms as our preferred path forward or think they
would solve all problems (or even the biggest ones), we do think they
are meaningful — and worthy of debate and consideration.
In Part II, we cast our gaze further and consider the long-term prospects for major structural reform of the Supreme Court. We argue that
the factors that generated a surge of interest in Court reform in the last
three years are unlikely to disappear. And, whatever the current political situation, there are realistic scenarios in which structural reform of
the Court begins to look possible once more. To be sure, structural reform faces — as it always has — an uphill battle. But its proponents
should not abandon their efforts to build political and intellectual support for institutional change that remains critically important and badly
needed.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4 See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148
(2019).
5 See Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, Supreme Court Reform and American Democracy, 130
YALE L.J.F. 821 (2021).
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I. REFORM IN THE NEAR TERM
After the failure of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Courtpacking plan in 1937,6 politicians have avoided attempts to meddle with
the Supreme Court’s membership and structure. But in the wake of
pitched political battles over the Court’s membership in the last few
years, Democratic politicians suddenly became willing to touch what
was once seen as a third rail. Presidential candidate Pete Buttigieg made
structural Supreme Court reform one of his marquee policies,7 and a
number of other candidates endorsed various, significant reforms.8 The
Democratic Party Platform ultimately included a call for “structural
court reforms to increase transparency and accountability.”9
In the wake of Republicans’ hasty effort to confirm then-Judge Amy
Coney Barrett to replace Justice Ginsburg, the calls for Court reform
became louder. Leading progressives demanded that Democrats retaliate by adding seats to the Court once they regained power.10 Shortly
before the election, then-candidate Biden did not endorse efforts to expand the Court11 but instead promised to create “a bipartisan commission of scholars, constitutional scholars, Democrats, Republicans,

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6 For detailed examinations of this episode, see JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010); BURT SOLOMON, FDR V. THE
CONSTITUTION: THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY (2009).
7 See Josh Lederman, Inside Pete Buttigieg’s Plan to Overhaul the Supreme Court, NBC NEWS
(June 3, 2019, 6:03 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/inside-pete-buttigieg-splan-overhaul-supreme-court-n1012491 [https://perma.cc/VC88-VZW4]. Buttigieg’s proposal was
co-created by the authors. See generally Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4.
8 Senator Bernie Sanders indicated support for “if not term limits, then rotating judges to the
appeals court as well.” Gregory Krieg, Bernie Sanders Floats Modified Term Limits for Supreme
Court Justices, CNN (Apr. 2, 2019, 12:42 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/01/politics/berniesanders-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/GX5D-UVWQ]. Beto O’Rourke endorsed 18year term limits. See Caitlin Huey-Burns, Beto O’Rourke Wants Term Limits for Supreme Court
Justices, CBS NEWS (June 5, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/beto-orourke-intervieworourke-talks-with-cbsn-elaine-quijano-voting-rights-supreme-court-today-2019-06-05
[https://perma.cc/BC2A-SD6D]. So did Andrew Yang. See Andrew Yang, 18 Year Term Limit for
Supreme
Court
Justices,
YANG2020 — ANDREW YANG FOR PRESIDENT,
https://www.yang2020.com/policies/scotustermlimits [https://perma.cc/DH5W-V4GP].
9 DEMOCRATIC NAT’L CONVENTION, 2020 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 58 (2020).
10 See Elaine Godfrey, The Democrats’ Supreme Court Hail Mary, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 24,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/09/democrats-case-court-packing/616446
[https://perma.cc/W5ZB-BRY7]; Kristina Peterson & Lindsay Wise, Senate Democrats Grapple with
Progressives’ Supreme Court Demands, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2020, 3:11 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-democrats-grapple-with-progressives-supreme-courtdemands-11600974659 [https://perma.cc/3ZA2-JPY3].
11 See Herndon & Astor, supra note 1.
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liberal, conservative,” that he would ask to “come back to me with recommendations as to how to reform the court system because it’s getting
out of wack.”12
Now-President Biden has named a commission, consisting of distinguished scholars and jurists.13 The Commission is tasked with providing, among other things, “[a]n analysis of the principal arguments in the
contemporary public debate for and against Supreme Court reform, including an appraisal of the merits and legality of particular reform proposals.”14 Given that the commission was designed to be bipartisan, it
may be unlikely to endorse bold structural reform, at least to the extent
that such reform would have a partisan valence. In addition, the slim
margin of Democratic control in the Senate — Democrats have only fifty
seats, with Vice President Kamala Harris breaking ties — means the
prospects for an aggressive partisan move to add Justices are dim at
best. That’s all the more so given that at least some Democratic
Senators are apparently unwilling to abandon the legislative filibuster15 — surely a necessary first step were Democrats to seek to expand
the Court on a party-line vote or pursue other muscular reforms aimed
at reining in the conservative majority, such as stripping the Court’s
jurisdiction. We expect the Commission to assess all reform options, but
given this political context, major reform appears hard to imagine for
at least the next two years.
Even so, that doesn’t mean that no reform is possible. As we see it,
there are a number of modest, though still meaningful, reforms that remain feasible and that are worthy of serious consideration. Some reforms would require congressional action, but others would not. Which
of these reforms one thinks is worth pursuing will depend on what, exactly, one sees as the problem with the Supreme Court that reform is
intended to solve. Some might see the problem as the Court’s ideology.
Others might believe that the Court is too powerful and insufficiently
deferential to the democratic process. In our own prior work, we have
argued that the problem is that the Court has become too polarized
along party lines and is increasingly likely to be seen as simply a partisan
institution.16 Here, we take a pluralistic approach, making no particular
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12 Jack Shafer, Opinion, Biden’s Slippery Tactic to Snuff the Court-Packing Debate, POLITICO
(Oct. 23, 2020, 7:13 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/23/biden-court-packingcommission-432036 [https://perma.cc/E9QR-6QYW].
13 Press Release, White House, President Biden to Sign Executive Order Creating the
Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 9, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/09/president-biden-to-signexecutive-order-creating-the-presidential-commission-on-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/L5DB-8TK4].
14 Exec. Order No. 14,023, 86 Fed. Reg. 19,569 (Apr. 9, 2021).
15 See Eric Levitz, The Democrats’ Civil War over the Filibuster Has Barely Begun, N.Y. MAG.
(Jan. 27, 2021), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/01/manchin-sinema-schumer-mcconnellfilibuster.html [https://perma.cc/K55L-J6BN].
16 See Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 4.
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assumptions as to the correct diagnosis of the problem and instead
simply cataloguing various possibilities as we see them.
In identifying many different kinds of possible reforms, we have several goals. First and most immediately, we hope to suggest to the relevant decisionmakers realistic and feasible ideas that might address some
of the problems to which would-be Supreme Court reformers have
pointed. At the same time, we also hope to expand the scholarly and
popular conversation about Supreme Court reform, by demonstrating
that there are many possible legislative proposals or policy changes that
can all be grouped under the larger heading of Supreme Court reform.
Reform need not be all or nothing; there are many small steps that could
be taken even if a large leap is presently impossible. Finally, we hope
to demonstrate that Supreme Court reform can come from institutions
other than Congress; the Executive Branch has its own role to play, and
the Court itself might wisely choose to reform itself in small ways in
order to reduce calls for more significant reform.
A. “Skinny” Court Reform Through Legislation
Legislative action is the most obvious way to reform the Court. One
major structural reform that some Democrats seem interested in advancing right now is Supreme Court term limits. Perhaps some may
imagine that term limits could pass despite narrow divisions in
Congress, given their apparent popularity with voters.17 But there are
reasons to doubt the viability of statutory term-limits reform. The leading Democratic proposal would not impose term limits on currently
serving Justices.18 That would likely mean that Democrats would not
obtain a majority on the Court for years.19 Why would Democrats waste
considerable political capital on a major reform that would not benefit
their agenda?20 Moreover, such a reform could even provide a windfall
to Republicans: if President Biden were able to appoint two Justices,
term limits would make it likely that any of his appointees would serve
for shorter periods than they would otherwise, especially relative to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., PUBLIC RESPONSE TO PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE SUPREME
COURT 3 (2020), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/CourtReformSurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZX3V7RP] (finding 60% of respondents supported term limits as short as six or eight years for Supreme
Court Justices); ADAM ROSENBLATT, FIX THE COURT: AGENDA OF KEY FINDINGS 3 (2020),
https://fixthecourt.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/PSB-May-2020-key-findings-TL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HY3-3WR3] (finding 77% support among Americans for either term limits or a
mandatory retirement age).
18 See Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointments Act of 2020, H.R. 8424, 116th
Cong. § 8(b) (2020).
19 See Ganesh Sitaraman (@GaneshSitaraman), TWITTER (Sept. 29, 2020, 9:10 AM),
https://twitter.com/GaneshSitaraman/status/1310929984626798592 [https://perma.cc/5DN6-UJSN].
20 Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV.
1154, 1168 (2006) (describing the “basic trade-off between impartiality and motivation” that makes
Supreme Court reform systematically unlikely).
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President Trump’s three appointees.21 One could imagine Republicans
recognizing what they had to gain by going along with the proposal, but
that same fact seems likely to preclude sufficient support among
Democrats. Term limits have other drawbacks as well. They might
make the Court more political, rather than less, by guaranteeing Court
nominations are an election issue every two years; that would be even
more true if, as some fear, the Justices themselves might shape their
opinions with an eye toward a post-Court political career.22 On top of
all that, whether term limits can be imposed via statute (rather than
constitutional amendment) is deeply controversial.23 These concerns are
another reason to question whether term limits could obtain sufficient
support to be enacted into law.
As a result, we see any major structural changes as unlikely in the
short term. Does that mean all statutory reforms are impossible? We
think not. It is conceivable that Senate Democrats could pursue somewhat less ambitious measures that could potentially attract sufficient
Republican support to survive a filibuster. In making this suggestion,
we do not mean to seem overly optimistic, given recent partisan rancor
in Washington generally and the Senate in particular. Nonetheless, the
possibilities we outline below are sufficiently conceivable that they deserve consideration.
One obvious starting place would be the imposition of ethics rules
on the Justices, including adopting a code of conduct, reforming gift and
disclosure rules, and putting in place guidelines around recusals.
Currently, the Justices are the only judges in the country not bound by
some code of ethics governing their behavior.24 Observers have raised
concerns about various episodes involving the Justices in recent years,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 For an in-depth examination of the potential consequences of different term-limits proposals
and how they would affect presidents’ relative influence on the Court, see Adam Chilton, Daniel
Epps, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Designing Supreme Court Term Limits, 95 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3788497 [https://perma.cc/
8MS9-WVD3].
22 See, e.g., Will Baude, One Cheer for Supreme Court Term Limits, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Oct. 26, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/10/26/one-cheer-for-supreme-court-termlimits [https://perma.cc/C2MY-JDNU] (expressing concerns about this “final-period problem”).
Note, of course, that the problem may not be limited to a “final period,” as Justices who aspire to
be politicians might want to build a record that appeals to their future political base and might
want to stand ready to resign for the right political opportunity.
23 There are reasonable arguments in favor of the constitutionality of imposing effective term
limits by statute. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Constitutionality of Reforming the Supreme Court
by Statute, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 345,
359–60 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul Carrington eds., 2006). But there are also weighty counterarguments. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 859–68 (2006).
24 See Steven Lubet, Why Won’t John Roberts Accept an Ethics Code for Supreme Court
Justices?, SLATE (Jan. 16, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/supremecourt-ethics-code-judges-john-roberts.html [https://perma.cc/D8KG-A6CS].
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such as the liberal Justices’ going on foreign trips paid for by outside
organizations25 or the late Justice Scalia’s hunting trip with Vice
President Dick Cheney weeks before the Court heard a case in which
the Vice President was the petitioner.26 Advocacy groups have urged
the adoption of ethics rules27 and conduct policies, 28 and members of
Congress have previously introduced legislation to impose such rules on
the Justices.29
And though some have raised constitutional concerns about
Congress’s ability to regulate the Justices’ conduct, Professor Amanda
Frost has argued that well-crafted legislation would fall within
Congress’s “broad, but not unlimited, authority to regulate the Supreme
Court Justices’ ethical conduct.”30 Imposing such rules could strengthen
public confidence in the Court during a period in which its legitimacy
has been threatened. And such rules might attract support from both
sides of the aisle, given that they have no obvious partisan valence. The
success of ethics rules is dependent on enforcement, and it is unclear
whether the Executive would enforce those rules if it created an appearance of interfering with the judiciary. Still, even with lax enforcement,
if the Justices fail to follow ethics requirements, public reporting will
likely increase pressure on them to comply — or further weaken confidence in the Court.
Another possible reform concerns the Court’s statutory decisions.
Although the Court’s constitutional rulings tend to attract the most attention, the Court hands down numerous opinions involving the interpretation of federal statutes each Term. Some of those decisions are
unanimous rulings on technical matters involving obscure provisions,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
25 See Opinion, The Justices’ Junkets, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2011), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-justices-junkets/2011/02/20/ABCJb7H_story.html
[https://
perma.cc/BSC9-WKQK].
26 See Dan Collins, Scalia-Cheney Trip Raises Eyebrows, CBS NEWS (Dec. 15, 2003, 10:19 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/scalia-cheney-trip-raises-eyebrows [https://perma.cc/7PDQ-S8PT].
For Justice Scalia’s response to calls for his recusal, see Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
27 See, e.g., JOHANNA KALB & ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., SUPREME
COURT ETHICS REFORM 2 (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/2019-09/Report_2019_09_SCOTUS_Ethics_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T5Q2BFPR].
28 For example, recently Professor Veronica Root Martinez, Professor Leah Litman, and Molly
Coleman sent a letter to the Democratic and Republican leaders of the House Judiciary Committee
urging Congress to enact stricter rules to prevent sexual harassment and other misconduct in the
federal judiciary. Letter from Veronica Root Martinez, Leah Litman, and Molly Coleman to Hon.
Hank Johnson and Hon. Darrell Issa (Apr. 14, 2021),
https://www.scribd.com/
document/502776588/Letter-to-Courts-Subcommittee-re-misconduct-reform
[https://perma.cc/QF4H-GGAY].
29 See, e.g., Supreme Court Ethics Act, H.R. 1057, 116th Cong. § 964 (2019); Twenty-First
Century Courts Act, H.R. 6017, 116th Cong. § 365 (2020).
30 Amanda Frost, Judicial Ethics and Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 443, 478 (2013).
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but others closely divide the Court along political and ideological lines.
Ian Millhiser has argued that Congress should pursue a “Civil Rights
Act of 2021” that would overrule multiple statutory decisions, such as
those approving forced arbitration and limiting the ability to sue for
employment discrimination.31
Such a law is more plausible than one might initially think. As
Millhiser notes, Congress successfully passed a similar omnibus override
bill in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.32 And while there is certainly the
possibility such a bill would face intractable opposition from Senate
Republicans, it bears note that the last major effort by Democrats to
overturn the result of a Supreme Court decision — the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 200933 — received some Republican support in the
Senate. Statutory reforms like this one present no constitutional issues,
and instead merely give Congress an opportunity to reassert its authority
over federal law — and to put the Court on notice that it does not act
with a totally free hand, at least in statutory cases.
Congress could also implement a procedure for regularizing review
of the Court’s statutory decisions going forward. Although Congress
can always revise statutory Court interpretations, it does so with less
regularity than it once did.34 The Congressional Review Act35 (CRA)
provides an analogy for reform. Under the CRA, regulations issued by
federal agencies are subject to a “fast track” process in which Congress
can pass resolutions of disapproval, which if passed by both houses and
not vetoed by the President overturn the regulation.36 One of us has
argued for a Congressional Review Act for the Supreme Court, which
would provide expedited procedures — including bypassing the traditional committee process and requiring priority on the House and Senate
floors — for Congress to reconsider the Court’s interpretations of federal
law.37 This would enable quick legislative fixes where there is sufficient
political support. Because such a bill would be purely procedural, it
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 Ian Millhiser, 9 Ways to Reform the Supreme Court Without Court-Packing, VOX (Oct. 21,
2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/21514454/supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett-packingvoting-rights [https://perma.cc/H27C-E5W2].
32 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-16).
33 Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
34 See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014) (offering
data on overrides over time); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (same).
35 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808.
36 See CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS (Jan. 14, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43992.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KM76-DRKJ].
37 Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Rein in an All-Too-Powerful Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/congressional-review-actcourt/601924 [https://perma.cc/H85R-LXYT].
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might not be seen as a partisan power grab. Moreover, concerns about
the institutional power of Congress vis-à-vis the Court could in some
circumstances cut across party lines.
Reforms to the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction that lack partisan valence might also be viable. For example, one of us has proposed expanding the Court’s jurisdiction to include a number of cases selected
at random from final judgments of the lower courts.38 That reform
would not seek to change the Court’s decisionmaking in any partisan
direction, but instead merely to force the Court to examine and rule on
legal issues that routinely arise in the lower federal courts but that might
otherwise escape the Court’s attention. Such a reform could also help
reinforce and emphasize the Court’s role as an institution that resolves
technical questions rather than one that issues grand pronouncements
on values-laden constitutional issues.39
B. The Executive Branch and Supreme Court Reform
Despite our arguments above, one might still conclude that getting
reforms through Congress is impossible in the short run. But even reformers who take this view need not give up entirely. The Executive
Branch can make policy changes that don’t involve Congress at all, and
Congress can make reforms to the Executive that would indirectly affect
the Court without targeting it. These changes should also be seen as
part of the larger project of Supreme Court reform.
Start with the observation that the Executive Branch — particularly
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) within the Department of
Justice (DOJ) — is one of the most influential players in constitutional
law. So much so that the Solicitor General has been called “the tenth
justice.”40 The Solicitor General not only has “substantive influence”
over the development of the law, but also “procedural influence” in
choosing which cases to bring to the Court.41 The Solicitor General’s
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
38
39

See Daniel Epps & William Ortman, The Lottery Docket, 116 MICH. L. REV. 705, 707 (2018).
Along these lines, one point of interest is Professor Benjamin Johnson’s argument that the
Supreme Court’s certiorari practices go far afield from what Congress authorized when providing
the Court with certiorari jurisdiction in 1891 and expanding that jurisdiction in 1925. See Benjamin
B. Johnson, The Origins of Supreme Court Question Selection, 122 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 10) (on file with the Harvard Law School library). As Johnson argues, there
is evidence that Congress intended to require the Court to review entire cases, and to cherry pick
distinct legal questions, through the certiorari method. Id. at 10–11. Johnson’s argument, if right,
would provide a further basis for Congress to try to reassert itself — even if doing so involved
merely holding hearings and not passing new legislation.
40 See, e.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND
THE RULE OF LAW 3 (1987).
41 Seth P. Waxman, Foreword: Does the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1117
(2001).
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choice of the order in which to bring cases, for example, can matter for
how the law develops.42
In recent years, the OSG has played a major role in the shape of the
Court’s docket by declining to defend federal statutes before the Court,
despite longstanding norms under which DOJ “has a duty to defend the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress whenever a reasonable argument
can be made in its support.”43 In the litigation that led to United States
v. Windsor,44 OSG under the Obama Administration refused to defend
the Defense of Marriage Act.45 Then, under the Trump Administration,
DOJ declined to defend the Affordable Care Act, arguing to the Court
in California v. Texas46 that the Act should be struck down in its entirety47 — a development for which some thought the precedent set by
the Obama Administration was partly to blame.48
There is much debate on the importance of the duty to defend.
Professors Neal Devins and Saikrishna Prakash argue that “there are
absolutely no good constitutional reasons to preserve the duty to defend.”49 Nonetheless, there are reasons to worry about DOJ’s political
leadership choosing to ask the Court to overturn federal statutes in cases
with a strong partisan valence. Such developments seem unlikely to
foster confidence in DOJ or in the notion of the Court as an institution
above politics. For this reason, Attorney General Merrick Garland
could consider instituting stronger policies requiring DOJ attorneys to
defend the constitutionality of federal statutes absent extremely compelling circumstances. Although there will certainly be disagreements
about what constitutes compelling circumstances and such a policy
could be reversed by a future administration, there could be value in
reestablishing, and deepening, the norm that DOJ’s job is to defend federal statutes.
A related point concerns DOJ’s participation in constitutional cases
before the Court. OSG participates in many hot-button cases as an amicus curiae, making arguments to persuade the Court of the current administration’s preferred view of important constitutional questions.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Many such cases directly implicate federal interests, such as federal statutes, federal agencies, and so forth. But some cases in which OSG participates do not, at least not obviously so. For example, did OSG under
the Obama Administration need to participate as an amicus in
Obergefell v. Hodges in order to lay out a contested view of the constitutionality of state gay marriage bans?50 Did OSG under the Trump
Administration need to participate in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia in
order to defend a broad interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
against a municipality’s rules governing adoption agencies?51 A policy
that limited OSG’s participation in hot-button cases could reduce the
appearance of the Court as a partisan institution, given that OSG’s positions in such cases are likely to track the political views of the party
controlling the White House.
Another political flashpoint has been OSG’s efforts to seek emergency relief from the Supreme Court. As Professor Stephen Vladeck has
documented, OSG under the Trump Administration sought emergency
and extraordinary relief from the Court far more frequently than under
previous Presidents.52 And it typically did so in cases raising the
highest-profile, most controversial issues.53 Where conservative judges
acceded to these requests, it gave “at least the appearance that the Court
is showing favoritism not only for the federal government as a party, but
for a specific political party when it’s in control of the federal
government.”54
The Attorney General (or Solicitor General) could design policies
limiting the circumstances in which OSG would seek emergency or extraordinary relief from the Court. True, such policies could be abandoned by a future administration and there is no guarantee that they
would change the substance of the Court’s decisions. But if the goal is
to turn down the political temperature surrounding the Court and to
rebuild trust in legal institutions, such a policy deserves serious consideration. We note also that members of Congress seem interested in reforms that might change how the Court deals with its “shadow
docket.”55
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
50 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3–4, Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14-574).
51 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11, Fulton v. City
of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (mem.) (No. 18-280).
52 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV.
123, 132–52 (2019).
53 See id. at 132–41.
54 Id. at 127.
55 The House Judiciary Committee conducted a hearing on the “shadow docket.” See The
Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property
and the Internet of the H. Committee on the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (2021). William Baude coined
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There is another systemic problem with the OSG’s role in litigation
before the Court. As one of us has argued, the Government has a meaningful and persistent advantage in cases involving criminal justice,
given various structural advantages and incentives the OSG has in comparison to lawyers for individual criminal defendants.56 A solution to
this problem is the creation of a “Defender General” who would advocate for the interests of criminal defendants collectively before the
Court.57 Given that criminal justice reform has become a surprisingly
popular issue,58 this reform could find support on both sides of the aisle.
Although this proposal would likely require statutory authorization or,
perhaps, unilateral action by the Court itself, it could help address systemic problems posed by the Executive Branch’s role at the Court —
problems that indirectly connect to public discontent with criminal
justice.
C. Voluntary Reforms: Court Reform from the Inside
The final source of Supreme Court reform could come from an unlikely source: the Court itself. The Justices could choose to adopt rules
constraining themselves. They might choose to do so in order to improve perceptions of the Court among members of the public. But doing
so might also be a way to help the Court stave off more aggressive reform efforts by Congress down the road.
The most obvious starting point would be for the Justices to voluntarily adopt ethics rules. Doing so might undercut efforts in Congress
to impose an ethics code on the Justices. And the rules the Justices
designed for themselves might be more amenable to the Justices themselves than whatever Congress would come up with. In fact, the Court
may already be at work on this effort. In testimony before Congress in
2019, Justice Kagan said that the Chief Justice was considering whether
to implement an ethics code for the Justices.59 As no ethics code has
since appeared, he may have shelved the effort. But, at a moment where
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
normal procedural regularity.” William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9
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72 (2020).
57 See id. at 1472; see also Adam Liptak, A Proposal to Offset Prosecutors’ Power: The “Defender
General”, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/us/a-proposal-to-offsetprosecutors-power-the-defender-general.html [https://perma.cc/88ZS-BUZ9].
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(June
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2020),
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59 See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Justices Tell Congress They Are Not Considering Televising Hearings, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2019, 6:39 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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the Court arguably faces greater political pushback than it has encountered in decades — exemplified by the sudden willingness to consider
Court-expansion by Democratic politicians60 — the time may be right
to resume those efforts. As Professor Veronica Root Martinez has put
it, adopting ethics reforms would “signal to the public that the institution and its members — the Justices — are above reproach.”61
An issue closely intertwined with ethics rules is the Court’s disclosure
of gifts and other potential financial transactions. There is bipartisan
support for the Court to become more transparent in its disclosures.
Recently, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (a Democrat) and Senator
Lindsey Graham (a Republican) sent the Court a letter suggesting that
“a legislative solution may be in order to bring the judiciary’s financial
disclosure requirements in line with other branches of government if the
Court does not address the issue itself.”62 The Court would be well
advised to take the hint.
Consider also the independent powers of the Chief Justice. For example, the Chief Justice has the power to designate federal judges to
serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).63 In 2013,
a report in the New York Times showed that “[t]en of the court’s 11
judges — all assigned by Chief Justice Roberts — were appointed to the
bench by Republican presidents.”64 It is possible that the Times story
may have pushed Chief Justice Roberts to pick both Republican- and
Democratic-appointed judges; in the intervening years, the court’s membership has become balanced between both parties.65 The Chief Justice
should voluntarily continue to pick both Republican and Democratic
appointees for FISC in roughly equal numbers in order to ensure a partisan balance — and signal that he is not simply committed to giving
Republican-appointed judges more influence over the shape of the law.
The Chief Justice has a variety of other administrative roles, including
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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62 See Letter from Sens. Sheldon Whitehouse and Lindsey Graham to Hon. John G. Roberts
and Hon. Scott S. Harris (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/2.4.2021%20Whitehouse-Graham%20SCOTUS%20travel%20%20gift%
20disclosure%20letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/U28L-32GL]. Republican Senator John Kennedy recently proposed the Supreme Court Transparency Act, which would impose more obligations on the
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63 Charlie Savage, Roberts’s Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 25,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/politics/robertss-picks-reshaping-secretsurveillance-court.html [https://perma.cc/U2E8-ASNM].
64 Id.
65 See United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Current Membership,
https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/current-membership [https://perma.cc/VVM5-VCLF].
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controlling some nonjudicial appointments, which he could also manage
in a balanced manner.66
The Court could also take steps to make its practices more transparent and less insular. Professor Kate Shaw has shown that the Court’s
selection of amici curiae to represent orphaned arguments have largely
gone to former law clerks of the Justices.67 The selections are important
as they give rare opportunities to gain experience arguing before the
Supreme Court. That the Court’s selection process tends to select individuals the Justices know well (indeed, have worked closely with) has
implications not only for the diversity of the Supreme Court bar, but for
the development of the law as well.68 With a 6-3 Court favoring conservatives, this dynamic suggests that conservatives will likely get more
opportunities to build a career arguing at the Supreme Court — and in
the process, shaping its decisions. The Court could instead establish a
more transparent process governing this selection.
The Court could also modify its rules governing the disclosure of
funding behind amicus curiae briefs. Senator Whitehouse has recently
urged the Court to strengthen these rules.69 At present, the Supreme
Court Rules require amici to disclose who made monetary contributions
to the brief,70 but where the amicus (or the funders of the amicus) is an
organization, the amicus need not disclose the organization’s ultimate
source of funding. Ensuring integrity in the amicus process seems especially important when the Court regularly relies on amicus briefs for
important factual citations in its opinions.71 And greater transparency
can only improve the perception of the Court in the public eye. These
are only a few of the possible ways the Court could reform itself. There
likely are others that the Justices themselves could identify. And while
these reforms are admittedly modest, especially when compared to the
major restructuring progressives have demanded, they would nonetheless be improvements to an institution that is facing a challenge to its
legitimacy. The Court should consider them on its own initiative, and
those outside the Court should encourage the Justices to do so as well.
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II. A LONGER VIEW
We have outlined ways in which some modest Supreme Court reforms, broadly construed, might still be possible in the short term. What
about the longer term — beyond the next two or four years, and thus
beyond today’s precise balance of political power? Calls for more significant Court restructuring will not dissipate overnight. Indeed, the
underlying causes of calls for Court expansion and other external constraints and structural reforms will likely persist.
Here, we proceed into the realm of speculation. We tread with humility about our ability to predict the future course of political events.
Nonetheless, consider one way things could play out. Within the next
few years, the strongly conservative majority on the Court could well
produce decisions that sharply move the law to the right and that generate significant public controversy. And those decisions would produce
significant reactions by Democratic politicians. If so, that will reawaken
calls for major structural change to the Court. In that moment, how the
public reacts and how much power Democrats wield in Washington will
determine whether structural Court reform becomes a realistic possibility. Public support for Court expansion or other types of major reform
seem more likely if the current Court becomes seen as highly partisan.
None of this is certain to happen. And we note that there have been
plenty of predictions over the years that the Court was about to make
radical changes to the law that did not quite come to pass. Three decades ago, Kathleen Sullivan in a Harvard Law Review Supreme Court
Foreword observed that the Rehnquist Court showed “surprising moderation” despite numerous predictions that “a conservative revolution
was at hand.”72 If such predictions proved overblown before, shouldn’t
we be careful about similar predictions today?73
Perhaps, but one could conclude that the situation now is different
from earlier moments. First, the conservative majority is not merely
5-4, but 6-3. That means that in many cases that are likely to divide
the Court along ideologically predictable lines, not just one but two conservative Justices would need to “swing” in order for the Court to issue
decisions that reach surprising results. That hasn’t been true in recent
decades, when there have been four ideologically liberal Justices needing
only one of the conservative Justices to join them to form a majority.
Second, the selection of Supreme Court nominees has become more
ideological in recent years, and the Justices who have joined the Court
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
72 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term — Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 24 (1992).
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recently appear to have much more rigid interpretive approaches than
their predecessors.
The three newest Justices — Gorsuch,74
75
Kavanaugh, and Barrett76 — have all expressed support for originalism and textualism.77 None seems likely to produce decisions that are
as ideologically unpredictable as Justice Kennedy, who was the Court’s
key swing vote from 2005 until his retirement in 2018. Moreover, legal
culture has become increasingly polarized in recent decades, such that
liberal and conservative Justices increasingly operate in different worlds
and speak to different audiences78 — a development that may produce
less ideological drift among Justices than seen in previous generations.
Finally, several early data points suggest that observers should not
expect “surprising moderation” from this Court. First, in a recent opinion, Justice Kavanaugh — who is now widely seen as the Court’s median Justice79 — voiced support for an aggressive reading of Article II
of the Constitution’s Election Clause, indicating an eagerness for the
Court to review rulings by state courts interpreting state election laws.80
Such rulings could well tip the outcomes of future elections and would
surely expose the Court to significant criticism from those seeking to
paint the majority as partisan.
Second, Justice Alito recently delivered a keynote address to the
Federalist Society that suggested his willingness to pursue an aggressively conservative agenda. In remarks that some saw as openly partisan, Justice Alito touched on numerous hot-button social issues, seeming
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to take sides on the Republican side of the culture wars.81 Based on this
speech, there is little reason to think that Justice Alito would prioritize
moderate compromises.
Finally, one of the first substantive rulings by the Court since Justice
Barrett was confirmed may be a preview of what is to come. In Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,82 the Court issued a 5-4 per
curiam decision, with Justice Barrett in the majority, enjoining occupancy limits imposed on the Diocese by New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo due to the COVID-19 pandemic.83 Justice Gorsuch wrote a particularly cutting concurrence in which he implied that the dissenters —
including Chief Justice Roberts — were “shelter[ing] in place when the
Constitution is under attack.”84 While it is too soon to say what this
new majority will do, the Roman Catholic Diocese decision suggests that
the majority may not be shy about issuing controversial decisions.
If the Court majority does choose to pursue an aggressive agenda,
what would happen next? Structural reform proposals could quickly become the top priority policy goal for progressives. What is currently
low-simmering frustration could boil over into fiery rage at any moment,
depending on what the Court does.
Whether all this happens, or whether it actually leads to any concrete
reforms, is anyone’s guess. But it is enough of a possibility that those
who study the Court and the Constitution should continue to do the
work of thinking about possible Court reforms so that political leaders
can be ready when the issue returns to the agenda. The conversation
about how and why to reform the Court will, and must, continue.
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